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Abstract 
The aim of the article is to examine a bribee-initiated corrupt transaction and 
the role of intermediaries in such a transaction, using a game theoretical model. 
Corrupt officers, who want to obtain a bribe from the public services they offer, use 
their power to increase red tape to enforce clients to pay a bribe. However, if the 
officer demands a bribe directly from the clients, they face the risk of demanding a 
bribe from a "whistleblower" client, who has high ethical values and complains to 
the law enforcement authority about every bribe demand from her. Thus, public 
officers may prefer using intermediaries to decrease the risk of being complained 
about and suffering penalties. 
I examine cases with and without intermediaries in such a scenario and then 
compare the results of the two. In the case where there is no intermediary, in some 
situations the risks involved may be so large that the officer may prefer not to 
demand a bribe. On the other hand, in the cases with intermediaries, the detection 
risk is reduced, so taking a bribe is nearly always more profitable for the officer. 
Based on the model’s results, policy suggestions for corruption prevention are made. 
Keywords: Corruption, bribe, clients, red tape, intermediaries. 
JEL classification: K42, C72. 
1. Introduction 
Corruption has been a big problem in many societies since ancient 
times. In all eras, studies on how to prevent corruption were performed; 
however, the problem has attracted more attention especially in the last two 
decades. International awareness on the issue is increasing.  
There are many definitions of corruption in the literature: Among 
them, the most commonly used is that of the World Bank: “the abuse of 
public office for private gain.” Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p.599) define 
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corruption as “the sale by government officials of government property for 
personal gain.”  
Corruption is a type of illegal transaction and, like all transactions, 
there is demand from the briber (the client, to get a public service or other 
benefit) and supply by the bribee (the public officer, having the power to sell 
the benefit); a price (the bribe) is created in proportion to the benefit 
obtained by the briber and compensates the officer for the risks and the 
effort involved. 
Corruption has important harmful effects on economies. Some of the 
most cited harmful effects are that it discourages entrepreneurs, which in 
turn harms investment, growth and the development of the country; leads 
governments to spend less on education and health; tax collection becomes 
inefficient and public spending wastefully high; harms democracy and ethics 
in the country, damages the legitimacy of the government and distorts 
income distribution. Many emprical studies, such as Mauro (1995), Gould 
and Amaro Reyes (1983), United Nations (1989), Klitgaard (1991), Mauro, 
(1998) show harmful effects of corruption. 
To be able to cure a problem, first, its fundamental causes should be 
determined. The causes of corruption are numerous and differs from country 
to country. Wage level of public officers, weight of government in the 
economy, culture and social structure, existence or non-existence of 
democracy, free media, independent judicary sistem and rule of law, 
education and income level of the society are among the factors affecting the 
degree of corruption in a society most (for a more detailed review of the 
literature on causes of corruption see Bayar (2003)).  
The aim of this article is to take a closer look at one of the factors that 
facilitates corrupt transactions: namely, the intermediaries. Using game 
theoretical reasoning, a bribee-initiated corrupt transaction is modeled. In 
the model, the cases with and without intermediaries are examined and 
compared. Lastly, based on the model results, policy suggesstions on 
corruption prevention are made.  
Intermediaries exist in many markets, legal or illegal. Efforts of 
intermediaries in product or service markets usually increase succesful trade 
possibilities by helping buyer and seller to come together, decreasing search 
costs, ensuring quality of the goods or services supplied or ensuring 
enforcement of contracts. A supermarket buys various types of goods 
households may need from a number of producers and supply them in one 
convenient place. Thus consumers instead of searching for producers of each 
good, reach many products they need in one convenient place, they save 
money and effort. Financial intermediaries bring together those people who 
save money and who want to make investment; without financial 
intermediaries savers’ and investors’ finding each other and building a trust 
between them to reach a loan agreement is much more difficult. However, 
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not all intermediaries serve good purposes. Some may cheat on the buyers or 
sellers or some may help illegal transactions. 
The existence of heavy red tape, opaque, difficult to understand rules 
and regulations encourage the establishment of intermediaries sectors 
around bureaucracies. People  may prefer working with intermediaries to get 
the services they are legally entitled to since otherwise they would have to 
struggle with heavy red tape. 
Corruption is a risky transaction. It is not legally enforcable, so the 
fulfillment of the contract largely depends on the relative powers of the 
parties. The briber may not get the good or service in question even if s\he 
has paid the price, the bribe. The bribee may face blackmail from the briber 
after delivering the service.  
The open announcement by an officer about his willingness to engage 
in a corrupt transaction may attract the best buyer, but it also attracts the 
attention of invetigating authorities and rivals or superiors wishing to share 
corrupt proceeds. Thus, the process must be secret. All three stages of 
corrupt transactions, searching for and negotiating the contract, contract 
enforcement and post enforcement lock-in, involve risk (Jain, 2001). 
Building a long-term, reputation-based relationship between the briber 
and the bribee decreases the risks involved, and so reduce the transaction 
costs of the corrupt transaction. However, building connections is also costly 
for the briber, so s\he must weight the costs of building connections against 
the gains from the reduced uncertainty involved in corrupt transactions with 
connected officers (Baç, 2001).  
The intermediaries sector that assits the public in obtaining 
government services, serves to decrease the risks of offering a bribe to an 
honest officer (from the perspective of the client of the public service)  or it 
decreases risk of demanding bribe from a “whistle-blower” client (from the 
side of the public officer). Intermediaries are specialized connection builders 
who decrease the costs involved in building connections. They do this job 
more efficiently by making the connection building ‘investment’ just once.  
“To root out corruption, it may be necessary to risk destroying some of 
the confidence that goes along with the trust that corrupt favors are 
reciprocated (...) for example, (...) regulating middlemen can impede them in 
creating networks of trusted relationships; encouraging whistleblowing can 
help to destroy the confidence among corrupt partners” (Lambsdorf, 
2002:845)” 
Bayar (2005) examines how intermediaries make corrupt transactions 
easier and more profitable for the parties, using a game theoretical model. 
The author examines role of intermediaries in a briber-initiated corrupt 
transaction and shows how intermediaries decrease the risk of a client who 
want to offer a bribe to the public officer and fears from being caught up if 
the officer is honest. In this article, I look at the other side of the coin and 
examine the role of intermediaries in bribee-initiated corrupt transactions. 
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My results show that intermediaries also decrease risks involved when the 
officer is the one who demands a bribe. 
Ökten and Hasker (2008) also model the role of intermediaries in 
corrupt transactions, but do not explicitly take into consideration who 
initiates the corrupt transaction. Thus, they rule out the risks originating 
from the types of the client from whom the officer demands a bribe. The 
authors emphasise the role of middlemen in decreasing enforcement costs of 
the corrupt transactions. That is, middlemen decrease the risk of revenge by 
the parties of corrupt transaction.  
Besides these articles that are directly comparable, in the literature, 
there are two classes of studies that are related to the current study. In the 
first class of studies there are models examining corruption as a type of 
illegal transaction. These studies show similarities to the first part of my 
model, the case without intermediaries. In the second class, there are models 
examining the role of intermediaries in the markets with asymmetric 
information and these models show similarities to the second part (the case 
with intermediaries) of my model. 
  Andvig and Moene (1990) examine corruption in public 
bureaucracies by taking a supply and demand approach. In contrast to my 
model, here the one who offers the bribe and starts the corrupt transaction is 
the client. The authors examine how differing costs of bureaucrats (moral 
and other), proportion of corrupt bureaucrats, salaries, discount rates of the 
players affect equilibrium corruption level.  
In his model Cadot (1987) examines a bribee-initiated corruption case. 
The corrupt transaction is started by corrupt officials asking for a bribe, as in 
my model. Thus, the official faces with the risk of denunciation by the 
client. Similarly to the results of my model, higher wage levels raise the 
opportunity cost of corruption, thus inducing the officials to take fewer 
bribes. The author also reaches a similar conclusion to myself that; the effect 
of harsh penalties may fall short of the expectations of the policy maker. 
Another similar conclusion is that increasing the regularatory power of the 
administration creates a basic incentive for corruption. 
Lui (1986), in his model, examines the intertemporal decision problem 
of corrupt officers in an overlapping generations framework. The model is a 
briber-initiated one. The author shows that the model generates several 
stationary equilibriums, some with low levels of corruption and others with 
high levels of corruption.  
Manion (1996) establishes a briber initiated corruption model and 
examines how the existence of corrupt and honest officers in a public office 
affects occurrences of corrupt transactions. She mentions that intermediaries 
may facilitate corruption in such a setting but she does not explicitly 
introduce the role of intermediaries into the model.  
Shi and Temzelides (2004) model bureaucracy and corruption in a 
market with decentralized exchange and with high or low quality goods. 
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Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce, 
thus informational asymmetries exist. The authors examine cases with and 
without bureaucracy and compare the results. The model results show that 
no bribes are exchanged in any equilibrium without bureaucracy. The 
authors conclude that corruption may occur only in the case with 
bureaucracy, in which case corruption reduces welfare - a finding also in 
line with the results of my model. 
Shevchenka (2004) analyses an economy where agents can either 
produce goods to be traded for consumption or become middlemen by 
opening a store. Intermediation has a welfare-improving role in the model, 
since it helps to reduce the severity of the problem of achieving the double 
coincidence of the customers’ desires, thus increasing the probability of 
consumption and decreasing market frictions.  
Biglaiser (1993) shows in his model that a middleman can reduce 
inefficiencies in a market where there are both low quality goods and high 
quality goods and where there is an adverse selection problem. 
Albano and Lizzeri (2001) show that intermediaries may increase 
welfare by providing information to the buyers about the quality of the 
products sellers sell. 
In Gehrig’s model (1993), the intermediary has no superior 
information about the quality of the product, but has the ability to 
communicate prices to everybody and the ability to commit to her quoted 
prices. The intermediary in such a situation serves the market by reducing 
trading frictions in the market. Intermediaries speed up the process of 
exchange and prevent bargaining breakdowns, thereby increase amount of 
profitable trade (in my model also intermediaries increase the number of 
(corrupt) transactions). The author also examines two different cases - the 
monopoly intermediary case and the case with more than one intermediary. 
Lizzeri (1999) examines the role of intermediaries in a market where 
there is a seller whose product’s quality is positive and a random draw from 
a given distribution and there are two potential buyers who do not know the 
quality of the product. The informational asymmetry between buyers and 
seller leads sellers to signal their quality by using intermediaries. The author 
shows how the welfare effects of the intermediaries change depending on 
whether the intermediary has monopoly power or intermediary market has 
an oligopoly structure. 
In his model Masters (2008) shows that, under some conditions, 
intermediaries may occur in a market endogenously, may serve no useful 
purpose and existence of them may be welfare reducing for the society.  
2. The model  
This part of the study models a bribee - initiated corrupt transaction, 
that is, a corrupt transaction occurring between the client and the public 
officer where the public officer is the one who plays the active role in the 
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transaction, i.e. (s)he is the one who demands a bribe. Clients want to get a 
valuable service from the public officer. The demand is legal and the public 
officer is obliged to provide the service. However, she also has the power to 
increase red tape. In the model there are whistleblower type clients who are 
people with high ethical values and report and complain when a bribe is 
demanded from them. The other type of clients are standard type clients who 
when required, pay a bribe, as long as doing so is profitable. Two different 
cases will be examined. The first one is the case in which there is no 
intermediary; the second one is the case in which there is an intermediary. In 
the case without an intermediary, the public officer faces the risk of 
demanding a bribe from whistleblower clients and thus getting a penalty. 
When an intermediary enters the picture, the risk of demanding the bribe is 
reduced. Thus, demanding a bribe through intermediaries is more profitable.  
The public officer and the intermediary share the benefit increased 
according to their bargaining powers, and especially according to whether 
the intermediary has a monopoly power or not. In the case with an 
intermediary, corruption is more widespread and the social costs are greater. 
In the final section, the results of running the two models will be compared 
and policy suggestions will be given.  
2.1. The case without an intermediary 
This part of the article models a corrupt transaction where 
intermediaries do not exist. There are two players: a public officer and a 
client. Clients want to get a service valuable for them from the public 
officer. They are of different types, namely standard and whistleblower 
types, which are determined by the nature in the first period. The public 
officer, using his advantageous position as the unique provider of the 
service, tries to obtain an illegal private benefit from clients. In the second 
period, he decides on how much red tape to apply to enforce clients to pay a 
bribe and the amount of bribe to demand from the clients. In the third 
period, clients observe the red tape and bribe choice of the officer and 
standard type clients decide on whether to pay bribe, go through red tape or 
withdraw; whistleblower type clients reject the bribe demand and complain 
about the public officer to the law enforcement agency. Game tree of the 
game is given at the appendix-2. 
First, nature moves and selects the types of clients. On the first type 
dimension, clients have types within the interval [0,Z] according to their 
willingness to pay for the service. The valuation parameter is represented by 
σ. A client of type σ attaches σZ amount of value to the service, where Z is 
the maximum amount of value attached by clients to the service. The 
valuation parameter of each client, σ, is a random draw from the uniform 
distribution UN [0,1]. 
On the second type dimension, attitude towards whistleblowing, there 
are two types of clients: a) standard type clients (represented by S), who 
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never report or complain about bribery; b) whistleblower type clients 
(represented by W), who are people with high ethical values, report or place 
a complaint if they are asked to pay a bribe. The probability of a client being 
whistleblower type is equal to λ, where λ Є [0,1] and it is a constant 
common knowledge to all players. 
The type set of each client can be represented by the pairs (σ, S) or (σ, 
W).Types on both dimensions are private knowledge and independent of 
each other. The officer does not know which type of client he is 
encountering; he only knows the probability distribution of the types.  
Since we examine the corrupt transactions which are initiated by the 
officer, the public officer is assumed to be corruptible and takes a bribe 
whenever it is profitable for him to do so. After nature chose types of the 
clients, without observing the choices of the nature, the public officer plays. 
The public officer chooses the amount of red tape (δ) he will apply while 
giving the service and a bribe level (β). These are assumed to be continuous 
variables. His strategy space can be defined as SPO Є [0,∞)x[0,∞). 
Clients play in the third period, after the nature draw their types and 
the public officer has decided on the amount of red tape he will apply and 
the amount of bribe to demand. Clients, observe the red tape and the bribe 
demand of the officer. Standard type clients have three alternative actions 
available to them. They can pay the bribe demanded by the officer and get 
the service (represented by PB); they can go through red tape and again get 
the service but incur red tape costs (represented by GRT); or they can 
withdraw, thereby abandoning their demand for the service (represented by 
W). The strategy space of the standard type client can be defined as SS=[f: 
[0,∞)x[0,∞)→{PB, GRT, W}].  
Whistleblower type clients, if a bribe is not demanded from them go 
through red tape as long as the amount of red tape does not exceed their 
valuation, otherwise withdraw and if a bribe is demanded from them reject 
and report the public officer to law enforcement authority. The strategy 
space of a whistleblower clients is SW=[ f: [0,∞)x[0,∞)→{GRT, Report, W 
}], GRT and W choices can only be used by whistleblower clients if bribe 
choice of the public officer is β=0, that is, if the officer does not demand a 
bribe.  
The law enforcement authority is the institution responsible for 
investigating and punishing corrupt officers. It is assumed that, through its 
own research, law enforcement authority can detect “k” proportion of 
corruption cases. Detection and punishment of a corrupt officer occurs also 
through a whistleblower client’s report/complaint. There are two costs for 
the corrupt officer if punished: loss of wage ω, since he is fired, and some 
fine/imprisonment (which costs F to the official). Loss of wage can be 
thought of as the present value (over the expected employment period) of 
the difference between the wage from current job of the officer and her best 
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alternative. F is assumed to be a linear function of β, F=αβ, for simplicity, 
so, amount of the fine increases with the amount of the bribe.  
Given that β is the amount of bribe public officer demands and δ is the 
amount of red tape applied to the client when he wanted to get the service 
without paying bribe, and ss is an element of the strategy space of the 
standard type client, the payoff function of a standard type client for each of 
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The officer determines the level of the red tape and amount of the 
bribe. Clients take both β and δ as given. Red tape is taken as money 
equivalent, that is, a monetary value corresponding to the disturbance caused 
by red tape. 
The payoff function of a whistleblower type client for each of her 
available strategies is defined as below, where θ is the cost of 
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The whistleblower client, due to her type, does not have the option of 
getting the service by paying a bribe. Her actions are pre-determined, 
behaves on the basis of her ideal thinking and if a bribe is demanded from 
her, she rejects and reports the officer, no matter how much it costs to her; 
that is, we assume that η is always greater than Ө. On the other hand, if a 
bribe is not demanded, she simply follows the procedures if the procedures 
does not exceed her valuation, otherwise withdraws. 
The officer gets utility from the amount of bribe he takes and gets 
disutility if caught by the law enforcement authority and punished. The 
officer also gets disutility from applying red tape (may be in the form of 
getting a warning from superiors etc.). The amount of disutility an officer 
gets from applying high red tape is represented by G(δ). For simplicity, G is 
assumed to be a linear function of  δ, G(δ)=φδ.  
Thus, the expected payoff of the officer (if he decides to demand a 
bribe) for each of the strategies of the standard clients is (if she is faced with 
a whistleblower client, she is reported and gets (-ω-F)) 
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If the officer decides not to demand a bribe, he does not apply red tape 
and apparently he will receive only his wage. If the officer decides to 
demand a bribe, he chooses the bribe level (β) and level of red tape (δ). The 
assumption here is that the service in question is a legal one. If the client 
does not give the bribe to the officer, the officer must deliver the service 
anyway. However, he has the power to increase red tape (by incurring the 
cost G(δ)). Next, I try to find Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game. I 
begin from the last period (last continuation game), the decision-making 
problem of the clients.  
In the third stage, a standard type client prefers accepting the bribe 
demand of the officer as long as σz-β≥ σz-δ (i.e δ≥β, the amount of red tape 
is greater than or equal to the amount of bribe demanded) and does not 
withdraw as long as at least one of the actions gives positive utility. When 
β= δ, σz-β=σz-δ, so a standard type client gets the same utility from 
accepting or rejecting the bribe demand of the officer. However, it is 
assumed that the client prefers paying the bribe in such an equality situation 
(for simplicity).  
The whistleblower type client goes through red tape as long as a bribe 
is not demanded from him and σz-δ>0 that is, if the amount of red tape does 
not exceed her valuation of the service. If officer demands bribe she reports 
him and gets the service by incurring the cost of whistleblowing and getting 
the utility of honesty. 
In the second stage, the officer plays. The officer knows that if 
standard type clients prefer going through red tape or withdrawing, he would 
not get any bribe. If β>δ, standard type clients prefer going through red tape 
(or withdrawing if red tape exceeds their valuation), but does not pay the 
bribe. On the other hand, the officer continues to be faced with the risk of 
facing with a whistleblower client. In this case if the officer demands a 
bribe, his utility function becomes: 
)())((VPO δαβωλ Gk −−−+=                                                   (4) 
As seen from the equation (4), VPO<0, thus the officer even prefers not 
to demand a bribe instead of setting β>δ, i.e. β>δ is a dominated strategy. 
On the other hand, if the officer chooses the amount of red tape to be 
greater than or equal to the bribe demanded (δ≥β), then standard type clients 
who value the service more than the bribe demanded, will prefer paying the 
bribe. Thus, the officer sets β≤δ and tries to maximize his expected utility as 
such: 
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  s.t. β≤δ                                                                                 (5) 
 
The first term of the payoff function shows the risk of officer to come 
across a whistleblower client or to be caught by the law enforcement 
authority. With (λ+k) probability, an officer encounters with a whistleblower 
client or caught by law enforcement agency. If these risks are realized, the 
officer gets penalized by a fine, which is assumed to be a linear function of 
the bribe he demanded, α β, and he is fired (and so loses his wage). The 
second term of the payoff function says that the officer faces a standard type 
client and is not caught by the law enforcement authority with probability 
(1-λ-k), and with probability (1-β/Z) this client values the service more than 
the amount of the bribe demanded (Since σZ~UN [0,Z]) and thus pays the 
bribe. The third term is the cost of applying red tape.  
Increasing red tape is costly for the officer thus, the officer sets the 
level of red tape no higher than the level necessary to induce the standard 
clients to pay the bribe, which is β=δ.  Thus, the inequality constraint of the 
maximization problem is satisfied with equality. Meaning that, while 
maximizing, we may write φβ instead of G(δ). The officer maximizes VPO 
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The second order derivative is negative, thus, β* is indeed the 












The optimum level of bribe demanded increases as the clients’ 
maximum valuation of the service increases and decreases as fines and the 
cost of rising red tape increase. The effect of the change in the proportion of 
whistleblower clients and the probability of being caught up by the law 
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Thus, increasing proportion of whistleblower clients and increasing 
probabilities of being caught up decreases the amount of bribe demanded by 
the public officer. Although increasing risks may lead officers to demand 
more money to compensate, the fear of increasing penalties (as size of the 
bribe increase) dominates. Note that, wage level does not directly effect the 
size of the bribe demanded; as will be seen in the next analysis, it is an 
effective factor in the participation constraint (whether to demand or not to 
demand a bribe) of the officer.  
Participation constraint of the officer can be checked by examining 
whether at the optimal red tape and bribe level, the utility from demanding a 
bribe is grater than zero, which is the base case if does not demand bribe (so, 
does not apply red tape either), thus only continues to get his wage. The 
officer’s expected utility function at the optimal points of bribe β* and δ* 
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is the participation constraint which determines the officer’s decision to 
demand a bribe or not. If this condition holds, the officer decides to take a 











β , and 
sets the optimum amount of red tape, δ*, equal to β*.  
If this condition does not hold, he does not demand a bribe and does 
not apply red tape either, since the officer expects no gains (on the contrary 
it incurs costs) from increasing red tape. A higher probability of 
encountering with whistleblower type clients, a higher probability of being 
caught by the law enforcement authorities, a higher cost of applying red 
tape, a higher level of wage, decrease the probability that the participation 
constraint holds (that is, corrupt transactions get less likely to occur). 
 In response to this strategy of the officer, standard type clients whose 
valuation exceeds the amount of bribe prefer paying the bribe. Others 
withdraw. Whistleblower clients prefer going through red tape as long as a 
bribe is not demanded from them and their valuation of the service does not 
exceed the amount of red tape. If a bribe is demanded from them, they 
complain to the law enforcement authority. 
The payoff levels of the players from playing their equilibrium 
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If the participation constraint does not hold, then the officer does not 
demand a bribe. β =0, so δ=0 also. In such a case, the utility levels the 
players achieve are: Uw
σ=Us
σ=σZ and VPO=0. Thus, the existence of 
corruption decreases the utilities of the standard type clients by β*. A public 
officer’s utility increases in response, but since it increases by less than β*, 
there are also deadweight welfare losses. 
2.2. The case with an intermediary 
When there is the possibility of using an intermediary, the structure of 
the game changes a lot. If the officer cooperates with an intermediary, his 
risk of demanding a bribe from the whistleblower client decreases. Clients 
have the alternatives of whether to go through red tape, withdraw or go to an 
intermediary and pay a bribe plus the commission of the intermediary. 
Standard type clients also decide on whether to give a bribe directly to the 
officer if the officer demands bribe directly from them.  
In the first stage, intermediary announces the amount of fee (f) to 
demand from the clients. Formally, intermediary seems just helping the 
clients to tackle with the red tape, to prepare documents, to trace the 
bureaucratic procedures etc. But, in reality the intermediary has a long run 
relationship with the officer and pays a bribe to the officer to remove red 
tape. Thus, the fee is constituted from the share of the intermediary plus 
share of the officer, which is the bribe officer collects by the means of 
intermediary (that is f=b+x, where b is the officer’s share and x is the 
intermediary’s share). The strategy space of the intermediary is defined as 
SI=[0,∞). Clients cannot observe these secret relationships, cannot know 
whether a bribe is given, but can just observe the fact that intermediary 
removes the red tape.  
After intermediary announces the fee, nature plays and determines the 
valuation and attitude types of clients and standard/whistleblower types, as 
in the case without intermediary. In the third stage, the public officer, 
without observing the types of the clients, determine the amount red tape to 
apply (δ). Clients, after observing the amount of red tape, decides on 
whether to go directly to the public office (GD), to go to the intermediary 
(GI) or to withdraw (W). If a client goes to the intermediary, she pays the 
fee and gets the service. If a client withdraws, he does not get the service, 
thus gets zero utility. On the other hand, if the client decides to go directly, 
in the fourth stage, the officer decides whether to demand a bribe (β) directly 
or not and the amount of bribe. If a bribe is demanded from her, in the fourth 
stage the whistleblower clients reject it and report the officer. The officer 
can be caught by the complaint of the whistleblower clients, or with k 
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probability, by the investigations of the law enforcement agency and gets αβ 
amount of  punishment, as before, if demands a bribe directly. Standard type 
clients, after observing a bribe demand of the officer, decide on whether to 
pay the bribe (PB), to reject paying the bribe and to go through the red tape 
or to go to the intermediary. Game tree of the game is given at the appendix-
2. 
Strategy space of the officer becomes SPO=[{(f:[0,∞)→[0,∞)),(f: 
[0,∞)x[0,∞)→[0,∞)}. The strategy space of the whistleblower type clients 
becomes SW=[f:[0, ∞)x[0,∞)→{GD, GI, W}] and the strategy space of the 
standard type clients becomes SS=[(f:[0, ∞)x[0,∞)→{GD, GI, W}),( f:[0, 
∞)x[0,∞)x[0,∞)→{GRT, GI, PB, W})]. The utility function of the 
whistleblower type client becomes (where θ is perceived cost of 


































δσ        (15) 
The whistleblower type client, by her nature, does not have the option 
of paying a bribe. She goes to intermediary if the level of red tape exceeds 
the fee of the intermediary. If both alternatives exceed her valuation of the 
service, she withdraws from her demand. Again her behavior when she faces 
with a bribe demand is predetermined, she rejects and reports. 
The utility function of the standard type is (where t Є {PB, GRT, GI, 
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   (16) 
Depending on the changing actions of the players, the utility function 
of the officer (if he decides to obtain a bribe through the intermediary) 
becomes 
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If the officer decided not to try to obtain a bribe, obviously he gets 
UPO=0 and does not apply any red tape. 
The intermediary plays in cooperation with the public officer and his 
share from the total amount demanded from the client is determined 
according to his bargaining power. 
Now I try to find the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game. Thus, 
I begin to solve from the last continuation game. 
A standard type client, after observing the bribe demand of the officer,  
If pays a bribe, gets σZ –β 
If goes through red tape, gets σZ – δ 
If goes to intermediary, gets σZ – f 
If withdraws, gets 0 
A whistleblower type client, after observing the bribe demand of the 
officer, rejects the bribe demand and reports the officer to law enforcement 
agencies, which gives σz – θ+η utility (because a whistleblower client has 
high ethical values, η is assumed to be very high and the client rejects bribe 
demand of the officer no matter how high θ is. Thus, the decision of 
whistleblower type client is taken as predetermined). 
The case where δ<f is the same as the case without intermediary, since 
if the level of red tape is smaller than the fee of the intermediary, nobody 
goes to intermediary, every client goes directly to the public office, and the 
officer may demand a bribe from the clients. 
Thus, the interesting case that we will examine is where δ≥f, thus the 
clients have incentive to go to the intermediary, as long as f does not exceed 
their valuation. In the last stage, standard type client pays a bribe if β<f≤δ, 
otherwise rejects the bribe demand and goes to intermediary (even though at 
the beginning she has chosen to go direct).  
Thus, the officer, in the fifth stage, if sets a bribe β≥f, nobody pays a 
bribe, everybody goes to intermediary and the officer gets a share of b from 
the clients whose valuation exceeds f. I will evaluate this option while 
examining the participation constraints. 
If the officer decides to demand bribe not only through intermediary, 
but also directly, in the fifth stage, she must set β<f. Expected utility of the 
officer in that case can be represented as: 














          (18) 
To be able to evaluate this function, first, the officer calculates 
posterior probabilities of the types of clients she faces, whether she is a 
standard type or whistleblower type client; given that the client has decided 
to go directly to the officer. 
The officer can calculate the optimization problem of the clients as 
well as they can. A whistleblower type client goes directly to the officer if 
red tape is smaller than the fee of the intermediary. Otherwise, as long as δ≥f 
(which is the case we examine in this section) she goes to the intermediary 
(For simplicity, it is assumed that, when the level of red tape and the fee are 
equal, clients prefer using the intermediary). 
A whistleblower type client prefers not to withdraw as long as at least 
one of the other options gives positive utility.  
A standard type client, as long as δ≥f, prefers to go to the intermediary 
and pay the fee (as long as σz – f >0 also holds). However, some of the 
standard type clients may also want to try their chance by going direct with 
the hope that the officer may demand a bribe lower than the fee of the 
intermediary.  Since we model the case where the corrupt transaction 
initiated by the bribee, we assume that the clients are so risk aversive that, 
they cannot offer a bribe directly to the officer (due to the risk that if she 
offers a bribe to an honest officer, the officer may complaint the client to the 
law enforcement agencies). We suppose, as long as δ≥f , “m” proportion of 
the standard type clients go direct, (1-m) proportion of them go to the 
intermediary. (e.g. some value time more, or do not expect to be faced with 
a corrupt bureaucrat vs. which may be modeled as another game).1 
Thus, the officer can assume that all the clients who apply directly are 
standard type if she sets the red tape level higher than the fee of the 
intermediary. This means the risks associated with demanding a bribe from a 
whistleblower client is eliminated if there is an intermediary and red tape is 
set to a high enough level to induce clients to use the intermediary.  
Thus the officer maximizes this function using β, where the first term 
represents the risk of detection by the law enforcement authorities, the 
second term represents the fact that officer can get bribe only from the 
clients whose valuations are higher than the bribe demanded and the third 
term represents the cost of applying red tape: 
                                                 
1  In fact, since we assume no time discounting, it is to the interest of all standard type clients first 
to go directly and see whether they get a small enough bribe demand. But, by setting the 
proportion m, we examine the more general case, we can see the case where all standard type 
clients try their chances just by setting m=1. 

























km           (20) 
Since increasing red tape is costly, the constraint δ≥f should hold with 
equality, that is δ=f . Since δ=f and β<f holds, the other inequality 
constraint, δ>β  also automatically holds. 












β . It can be observed that, the amount of 
bribe taken directly (even from the ones who do not use intermediary) is 
greater in the case with intermediary. Amount of bribe demanded increases 
as the valuations of the clients increase. On the otherhand, as the probability 
of detection and proportion of the punishment increases, amount of bribe 
demanded decreases. Effect of proportion of the whistleblower clients is not 
a relevant factor in the determination of bribe, mere existence of an 
intermediary eliminates this risk. 
In the first stage, the intermediary set the fee, bargaining with public 
officer, by taking into consideration how will be the strategies of the clients, 
probability distribution of the types and the strategies of the public officer in 
the proceeding stages of the game.  
Intermediary and the public officer, while determining the fee, try to 
maximize their joint payoff. (represented by f=(b+x)). For simplicity, we 
assume that taking a bribe through intermediaries has no risk of being 
caught up, since the clients even do not know the secret relationship between 
the intermediary and the officer and since there is a relationship between 
intermediary and officer depending on mutual trust, the corruption can more 
easily be hidden from the law enforcement agencies.2 
Max Π=(λ+(1-m) (1-λ))f(1-f/Z)                                                        (21) 
So, the optimum amount to be demanded from the clients becomes 
f*=Z/2                                                                                                (22) 
After determining the amount to be demanded from the clients as such, 
the officer sets the optimum level of red tape as δ*=f*=Z/2.  
This amount is shared between officer and the intermediary according 
to their bargaining powers. In that process, participation constraints, and 
reservation values/disagreement points of the parties become important. 
Then, intermediary gets his share from f*=Z/2 and participates as long as his 
                                                 
2 This assumption can be revealed easily by adding a penalty term (negative utility) with an 
independent probability of detection to the utility functions of the intermediary and the officer. 
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participation constraint holds. We can assume that if the intermediary does 
not make intermediation, he can find a job in the economy with a salary 
level s (or can establish a business and gain profit of s). Thus, the 
intermediary participates as long as his expected revenue is greater than that 
alternative salary, which means: 
Π=(λ+(1-m) (1-λ))x(1-f/Z)>s                                                        (23) 
The participation constraints of the officer (about whether demanding 
a bribe through intermediaries or not) can be represented with the condition 
that the officer prefers using intermediary both to the case without 



























>0    (24) 
The other participation constraint of the officer is whether to demand a 
bribe from the clients who come directly to the office or letting them also go 
to the intermediary: 








λαβωλ >0 (25) 
if k is large, demanding a bribe directly from the clients can be prohibitively 
high and all corruption occurs through intermediaries.  
Apparently, in equation (24), the first part of the inequality is greater 
as long as b* and m are not very small or φ is not very big, which means 
that, there is an increase in corruption cases if intermediaries exist. As the 
proportion of whistleblower clients and/or detection probabilities of law 
enforcement agencies increases or the wages of the officers’ rises, use of 
intermediaries increases. This means, the policies that can be effective in 
preventing corruption in the case without intermediaries can only increase 
the use of intermediaries in the case with intermediaries. Only increase in φ, 
cost to the public officials of increasing red tape, discourages corruption 
both with and without intermediaries. This constraint can also be interpreted 
as, if the officer incurs high costs from increasing red tape, his bargaining 
power for getting share b from the total amount obtained from the client, f, 
increases.  
Thus, in the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, a proportion of 
standard type clients prefer to apply to the intermediary and the remaining 
ones go directly to the public office. The officer sets red tape high enough to 
induce standard clients pay a bribe or go to intermediary rather than 
satisfying the requirements of the red tape, thus, δ*=f=Z/2. Standard type 
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clients who has chosen to go to the intermediary pay (b+x)=Z/2 to the 
intermediary and the ones who has chosen to go the public office directly 





β =  ,as long as one of these options give 
positive utility, otherwise they withdraw. One should notice that the amount 
paid directly to the officer is smaller than the fee paid to the intermediary, f. 
If we assume that all standard type clients are identical then all should prefer 
bribing the officer directly and thus m=1, this constitutes a special case of 
the more general representation of the model.  
In the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, whistleblower clients go to 
intermediary if σZ-f*>0; they withdraw otherwise. They never face a bribe 
demand.  
The officer and intermediary share the total amount obtained, f, with 
shares b and x respectively, the amounts of which are determined according 
to the bargaining power of each person and thus represent the best 
alternatives available for each.3  
Utility level of the intermediary turns out to be: 
UI= ( ) )/*1()1)(1( Zfm −−−+ λλ x* 
In the case with intermediaries, demanding bribe becomes less risky 
for the public officer. Thus, her utility increases. Remember that equilibrium 
utility levels of the players in the first case (the case without intermediaries) 
was 
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                  (28) 
These values should be compared with the ones in the case with 
intermediaries: 
US
direct = σZ – 
2
)1( Zkα−
                                                                  (29) 
US
usinginterm = σZ–Z/2                                                                          (30) 
UW= σZ –Z/2                                                                                     (31) 
                                                 
3 Bargaining problem between the officer and the intermediary is given at the appendix-1. 


















 (32)                
clients’ utilities are the highest in the case without corruption, second 
highest in the case without intermediary and lowest in the case with 
intermediary. In the case with intermediary utility of the public officer is 
higher as long as the officer's share from the total amount gathered from the 
clients is not too low. This also enters into the bargaining process of the 
officer with the intermediary. The officer does not accept a share of f* such 
that he will get lower utility in comparison to the case where an intermediary 
is not used. The bargaining on the f* depends on the bargaining powers of 
the players.  
For the intermediaries sector to be established, the share of both public 
officers and intermediary must be at least equal to their payoffs from their 




















       (33) 
must hold. 
Consequently, increasing costs of red tape to the officers, decreasing 
alternative wages of intermediaries makes the establishment of an 
intermediaries sector more likely. Increasing the wages of public officers, 
increasing penalties and increasing the proportion of whistleblower clients, 
increasing probability of detection of law enforcement agencies, since 
increase the risk of demanding a bribe directly, decrease the share public 
officer demands and make the establishment of an intermediaries sector 
more likely.  
Thus, policies that can work to reduce corruption in the case without 
intermediaries cannot decrease corruption in the case with intermediaries; 
they can just increase intermediary usage. Another important point is that, if 
intermediary candidates have alternatives of better-paying jobs (i.e. s is 
high), establishment of an intermediaries sector gets less likely. Thus, 
increasing economic growth and investments, and the existence of a 
booming private sector in the economy make a damping effect on the 
establishment of an intermediaries sector; thus it has an indirect effect on 
decreasing corruption.                  
3. Discussions and conclusions 
Bureaucratic rules, permits, licenses etc., in many countries lead to the 
appearance of intermediaries sectors. These sectors are usually established 
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around the bureaucratic services involving heavy red tape. Formally, they 
are established to save clients' valuable time- to follow up the bureaucratic 
procedures, fill in forms, or give required documents. However, behind the 
scenes, these industries may be a way of serving corrupt transactions. The 
sector may decrease the risks involved in the corrupt transactions by 
separating the briber and the bribee, playing a mediator role.  
The model aims to examine the factors leading to the establishment of 
intermediaries sector and to figure out how they facilitate corrupt 
transactions. The most significant result of the model is that the existence of 
intermediaries can decrease the corrupt officers’ probability of being caught 
down to zero. The existence of such a ‘big service’ makes demanding a 
bribe nearly ‘always profitable’ from the viewpoint of the officers.  
In the case where there is no intermediary, in some situations, risks 
involved may be so large that the officer may prefer not to demand a bribe. 
High wages, severe penalties, a large probability of being caught up by the 
law enforcement agencies or a high ratio of whistleblower type clients in 
comparison to standard type clients may cause the participation constraint 
not to hold. Thus, a benefit-maximizing officer, may prefer processing the 
applications without demanding a bribe not necessarily due to his honesty, 
but since bribe taking is not profitable.   
On the other hand, in the cases with intermediary, detection risk is 
reduced, so taking a bribe becomes nearly always more profitable for the 
officer (as long as the cost of increasing red tape is not very high). In such a 
situation, high wages, high penalties, a high proportion of whistleblower 
clients etc. cannot stop officers from demanding a bribe. Such changes in 
these parameters can only increase the share of the intermediary from the 
payments made by the client, thus encouraging the establihment of an 
intermediaries sector.  
 Another important point is that the model shows that 
intermediaries give the biggest ‘service’ to the officers. Clients do not get a 
benefit from the existence of intermediaries on the contrary, their utilities 
decrease in comparison to the case without intermediary. The officer and the 
intermediary get the whole benefit. Clients are always worse off than in the 
case where there is no corruption, and so they get the service without paying 
any bribe and without incurring red tape costs. 
The public officer demands a bribe using the threat of increasing red 
tape, and clients give the bribe directly or through an intermediary to avoid 
the cost of dealing with red tape. Therefore, the discretion of officers to 
increase red tape, vague rules, procedures, and regulations lead to a fertile 
environment for corrupt transactions to occur and an intermediaries sector to 
be established. The model results show that increasing the costs of red tape 
reduces the amount of corruption both with and without intermediaries. 
Public officer demands bribe using the threat of increasing red tape and 
clients give bribe directly or through intermediary to avoid the cost of 
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dealing with red tape. So, when the threat power of public officers is taken 
out of their hands, they cannot collect a bribe. If rules were widely known 
and clear, procedures were simple and fast, if there were well-established 
mechanisms controlling officers, then clients (both whistleblower and 
standard types), would prefer getting the service by going through the 
procedures. They would neither go to intermediaries, nor give bribes directly 
to the officers.  
 The case should also be evaluated from the point of view of the 
social costs it caused. The opportunity cost of the ‘service’ given by the 
intermediaries sector should also be taken into consideration. If such a sector 
did not exist, people and capital employed in this sector could be used in 
productive sectors, and could produce goods and services that are valuable. 
The model also shows us that, as the opportunity cost of intermediaries 
increases, that is, as the salary an intermediary can get from another job 
increases, the use of intermediaries gets less likely. Thus, an economy’s job 
creation capacity is another important factor in the establishment of 
intermediaries sector. If in the economy (especially in the private sector) 
investment level is high, then new jobs are created at a fast pace, thus, 
intermediaries’ opportunity cost is higher and they will be used less. Since 
without intermediaries corruption is risky, the level of corruption will also 
decrease. Since corruption decreases the total welfare of the society, when 
corruption level declines, welfare of the society rises. Resources wasted by 
rent-seeking activities can be used to produce goods and services that are 
valuable instead. 
 Assuming that all public officers are corruptible is not very 
realistic of course. There are many people in bureaucracies holding to moral 
principles and not taking bribes, no matter how profitable it is to do so.  
 However, I would claim that, systems should be designed by 
taking into consideration the people who can abuse it. Combating corruption 
should of course involve moral education. However, there will always be 
immoral people who will engage in corruption whenever s\he finds it 
profitable. Best is to design systems such that, even for the most opportunist 
people, bribe taking seems unprofitable. To be able to examine the 
characteristics of such a system design, it is assumed that officers are 
corruptible and the model tries to offer policy solutions to design the system 
so as to prevent these immoral people reducing society’s welfare.   
An aspect of the problem that can be examined in future work may be 
corrupt transactions involving illegal services. In cases where the client 
applies for a service that she is not legally entitled to, the problem changes a 
lot. The public officer this time has more power than just increasing red 
tape- he can refuse to provide the service. The risks involved are also higher. 
In such a transaction the intermediaries sector provides more important 
services for the corrupt parties.  
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Appendix-1 
Bargaining Between the Officer and the Intermediary 
If the intermediary is monopoly, he captures all surpluses after 
compensating the officer for losses; so as to give the same utility to the 
officer with directly demanding a bribe or not demanding any bribe at all. 


























λαβωλ −−−−+−−+  
and x*=Z/2-b* (as long as ( ) )/*1()1)(1( Zfm −−−+ λλ x*>s).  
If there are more than one intermediary, Bertrand Competition among 
them reduces economic profits to zero and thus all intermediaries can just 
get s; the remaining surplus is captured by the officers. So, 
( ) )/*1()1)(1( Zfm −−−+ λλ x*=s  
and b*=Z/2-(s/ ( ) ))/*1()1)(1( Zfm −−−+ λλ ).  
Of course, as long as this gives the officer a higher utility than the case 
without intermediary, *))*,(**)(* bUV POwithPOwithout ββ <  
If the bargaining powers of the parties are equal, Nash Bargaining 
Solution can be reached by maximizing the following function using UPO, 
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Appendix-2 
























































48                                          Güzin BAYAR 
References   
ALBANO, G.L. and LIZZERI, A. (2001). “Strategic certification and provision of quality”, 
International Economic Review, 42: 267–283. 
ANDVIG, J. C. and MOENE, K. O. (1990), "How Corruption May Corrupt", Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization", 13, 63-76. 
BAÇ, M. (2001), “Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a 
Better Scene?, Public Choice, Vol. 107 (1-2), pp. 87-96. 
BAYAR, G. (2003), “Corruption-A Game Theoretical Analysis”, Ph D Thesis, Middle East 
Technical University, June 2003. 
————(2005), The Role of Intermediaries in Corrupt Transactions, Public Choice, 122(3), 
277-298. 
 BENNETT, R.J. (1997), “Trading Cards, Heroes and Whistleblowers”, Humanist, 57(2). 
 BIGLAISER, G. (1993), "Middlemen as Experts", RAND Journal of Economics, 24(2), 212-
223. 
BOZEMAN, B. (2000), “Bureaucracy and Red Tape”, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
BUSCAGLIA, E. (2001), “An Analysis of Judical Corruption and Its Causes: An Objective 
Governing – Based Approach”, International Review of Law and Economics, 21, 
233-249. 
CADOT, O. (1987), “Corruption as a Gamble”, Journal of Public Economics, 33, 223-244. 
GEHRIG, T. (1993), "Intermediation in Search Markets", Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, 2(1), 97-120. 
GOULD, D. J., Reyes, J.A.A. (1983), “The Effect of Corruption on Administrative 
Performance”, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 580, The World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
HASKER, K, & Ökten, Ç. (2008), Intermediaries and Corruption, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 67, 103-115. 
JAIN, K. A. (2001), "Corruption: A Review", Journal of Economic Surveys", 15(1), 71-121. 
JOHNSON, S., KAUFMANN, D and ZOIDO-LOBATAN, P. (1998), “Regulatory discretion and the 
unofficial economy, American Economic Review, 88, 387-392. 
KAUFMANN, D. (1997), "Corruption: The Facts." Foreign Policy 107 (Summer): 
pp. 114-131. 
KLITGAARD, R. (1991), “Gifts and Bribes”, Strategy and Choice, ed. R., Zeckhauser, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
LAMBSDORF, J. G. (2002), “How Confidence Facilitates Illegal Transactions: An Empirical 
Approach”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 61(4), pp. 829-853. 
LEFF, N. H. (1964), “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption”, Political 
Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, ed. A. J., Heidenheimer, H., 
Reinhart, New York, pp. 8-14  
LEYS, C. (1970), “What Is The Problem About Corruption”, Political Corruption: Readings 
in Comparative Analysis, ed. A. J., Heidenheimer, H., Reinhart, New York, pp. 31-
37. 
LIZZERI, A. (1999), "Information revelation and Certification Intermediaries", Rand Journal 
of Economics, 30(2), 214-231. 
LUI, F. (1985), “An Equilibrium Queueing Model of Corruption”, Journal of Political  
Economy, 93, pp. 760-781. 
LUI, T.F. (1986), “A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 31, 215-236. 
MASTERS, A. (2008), Unpleasant Middlemen, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 68, 73-86. 
MAURO, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), pp. 
681-712. 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 49 
————(1998), “Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Agenda for Further Research"” 
Finance & Development, 11-14. 
SCHEVCHENKO, A. (2004), “Middlemen”, International Economic Review, Vol. 45(1), pp. 1-
24. 
SHI, B., TEMZELIDES, T. (2004), “A Model of Bureaucracy and Corruption”, International 
Economic Review, Vol. 45(3), pp. 873-908. 
SHLEIFER, A., VISHNY, R.W. (1993), “Corruption”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
108, 519-617. 




Yolsuzluk ve aracılar- bir oyun kuramı yaklaşımı 
Bu makelenin amacı oyun kuramı kullanılarak “rüşveti alanın” başlattığı bir yolsuzluk eylemini ve 
bu eylemde aracıların rolünü incelemektir. Verdiği kamu hizmetinden rüşvet almak isteyen ahlak 
seviyesi düşük bürokrat, hizmeti alan vatandaşları (müşterileri) rüşvet vermeye zorlamak için 
kırtasiyeciliği artırma gücünü kullanmaktadır. Ancak, rüşvetçi bürokrat kamu hizmetinin 
müşterilerinden rüşvet istediği zaman, yüksek ahlak seviyesine sahip, kendisininden istenen rüşvet 
hakkında her zaman hukuki işlem yaptırmayı seçen “idealist” tip bir müşteriden de rüşvet isteme ve 
deşifre edilip cezalandırılma riski ile karşı karşıyadır. Bu sebeple bürokrat, şikayet edilmek ve ceza 
almak riskini azaltmak için aracılar vasıtasıyla rüşvet almayı tercih edebilir. 
Bu makalede aracılı ve aracısız olmak üzere iki yolsuzluk eylemi tipi incelenmiş ve sonuçları 
karşılaştırılmıştır. Aracıların olmadığı durumda, bazı şartlar altında riskler o kadar fazla olabilir ki, 
rüşvetçi bürokratlar bile yolsuzluğa bulaşmamayı tercih edebilir. Ancak, aracıların bulunduğu durumda 
yakalanma riski çok düşmekte ve rüşvet almak ahlak seviyesi düşük bir bürokrat için neredeyse her 
zaman karlı olmaktadır. Model sonuçlarına dayanılarak, yolsuzluğu önlemek için alınabilecek tedbirler 
önerilmektedir.  
Anahtar kelimeler : Yolsuzluk, rüşvet, müşteriler, kırtasiyecilik, aracılar. 
JEL kodları: K42, C72. 
 
 
